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Abstract
This paper documents a marked increase in international consumption risk
sharing throughout the recent globalization period. Unlike earlier studies
that have found it di¢ cult to document a consistent e¤ect of nancial glob-
alization on international consumption comovements, we make use of the
information implicit in the relative levels of consumption and output to mea-
sure long-run risk sharing among OECD countries and US federal states.
We derive our empirical setup from a deliberately simplistic model in which
countries can trade perpetual claims to each others output (Shiller securi-
ties). Our framework allows us to distinguish between two channels of risk
sharing: ex ante diversication that leads to income smoothing through cap-
ital income ows and ex-post consumption smoothing through savings and
dissavings. The model successfully replicates the patterns of income and
consumption smoothing observed in both U.S. state-level and international
data. The increase in international consumption risk sharing is closely asso-
ciated with the decline in international portfolio home bias. While capital
income ows remain relatively limited as a channel of risk sharing at business
cycle frequencies, we nd that better international portfolio diversication
has led to a considerable increase in capital income ows at medium and long
horizons.
Keywords: Consumption Risk Sharing, International and regional busi-
ness cycles, Capital ows, Home Bias, Non-stationary panel data
JEL classication: C23, E21, F36
1 Introduction
Financial market integration should lead to better international consumption
risk sharing. Our rst objective in this paper is to show that consumption
risk sharing among OECD countries has indeed increased considerably dur-
ing the recent globalization period, i.e. in particular after 1990. Our second
objective is to investigate to what extent improvements in international con-
sumption risk sharing have been associated with increases in international
factor income ows and whether these improvements can eventually be linked
to the dramatic increase in international cross-holdings of nancial assets that
has been documented in the recent literature.
The extant literature on international risk sharing has found it di¢ cult
to document a consistent e¤ect of nancial globalization on consumption. In
line with most of this literature we base our empirical analysis here on a key
implication of complete nancial markets: uctuations in relative (i.e. idio-
syncratic) marginal utility growth should be independent of idiosyncratic risk
(as measured by relative output growth rates). Therefore, the coe¢ cient of a
regression of relative consumption growth on relative output growth should
be zero.1 If nancial markets are incomplete, the size of this coe¢ cient can
be directly interpreted as a measure of the deviation from the complete mar-
kets outcome. Generally, such risk sharing regressions have been estimated
with data that has been rendered stationary through rst di¤erencing. One
novelty of our approach is to use the information implicit in the levels of rel-
ative consumption and output by running (panel) risk sharing regressions in
relative log levels rather than in relative growth rates. The level specication
allows us to document longer-term trends in consumption risk sharing that
other specications, based on rst di¤erences of the data, have not been able
to pick up. Based on our level specication, we document that consumption
risk sharing has indeed increased considerably since 1990.
We motivate our econometric approach from a simple model that allows
us to interpret the coe¢ cient in the risk sharing regression as the share of
the average countrys or regions wealth held in claims to domestic output 
the coe¢ cient is a measure of portfolio home bias. Our framework, while
consistent with virtually all theoretical models of consumption behaviour, is
su¢ ciently simple to allow us to address the second objective of this paper:
once we have estimated the degree of home bias based on consumption and
output data, we can use the model to generate income data (dened as output
1Similar regressions were rst proposed by Mace (1991), Cochrane (1991) and Townsend
(1994) as tests of the null of market completeness. In the macroeconomic literature, they
were popularized by Asdrubali, Sørensen and Yosha (1996), Crucini (1999) and others.
For an excellent survey on home bias and consumption risk sharing see Lewis (1999).
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plus net capital income ows) that we then compare to real-world GNP and
state level income data.
Our empirical analysis is based on two data sets: the rst is an interna-
tional (OECD) data set and ranges from 1960 to 2004, whereas the second
is the data set for U.S. federal states employed in the seminal paper by As-
drubali, Sørensen and Yosha (1996). This data set ranges from 1960-90. Our
ndings can be summarized as follows:
The lack of international consumption risk sharing that is so widely doc-
umented in the literature is considerably less pronounced in what we refer
to as the globalization period, i.e. after 1990. These improvements in in-
ternational consumption risk sharing are explained mainly by increases in
international capital income ows. Our model estimated from consump-
tion and output data alone correctly predicts this growth in risk sharing
through international income ows and it successfully replicates the patterns
of consumption smoothing and income risk sharing among both U.S. federal
states and OECD countries. In addition, we show that both phenomena 
the growth in international capital income ows and risk sharing are driven
by the explosion of international gross holdings of foreign assets over the last
fteen years.
Our results would seem to contradict a key stylized fact established by
the recent literature on international risk sharing: From the seminal papers
by Asdrubali, Sørensen and Yosha (1996) and Sørensen and Yosha (1998)
we know that capital income ows derived from cross-holdings of claims to
productive capital are a much more important channel of risk sharing among
regions or federal states than among countries. Indeed, following Sørensen
and Yosha (1998), a number of authors (Lane (2001) and Becker and Ho¤-
mann (2006)) have shown that the fact that this channel is virtually absent
in international data can account for virtually all of the lack of consump-
tion risk sharing at the international level. While a number of studies using
more recent data also discover a growth in risk sharing and in capital income
ows, this increase is relatively modest and remains limited both relative to
the growth in international asset gross holdings and to the increase in risk
sharing we document here (See Sørensen, Yosha, Wu and Zu (2006) and
Kose, Prasad and Terrones (2006) as well as the literature surveyed there).
We corroborate the tenor of the results of these studies and it would there-
fore seem surprising that capital income ows derived from gross-holdings of
foreign assets are such an important source of risk sharing. The reason, why
our results are so di¤erent is, again, that our level risk sharing regressions
let us focus on the medium to longer term. At business cycle frequencies
and as long as macroeconomic uctuations are transitory it may not make
a big di¤erence for consumption allocations whether countries smooth their
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consumption through savings or dissavings or through capital income ows
derived e.g. from equity (Baxter and Crucini (1995)). Furthermore, a recent
literature (Lane and Milesi Ferretti (2003), Gourinchas and Rey (2006)) has
started to emphasize the role of valuation e¤ects for the dynamics of foreign
asset positions. At short horizons, such valuation e¤ects could in principle
act as an insurance mechanism that provides an alternative to foreign capi-
tal income ows. For these reasons we argue that it is at the longer horizon
where we should expect to see the impact of declining home bias on capital
income ows most strongly and this is what we nd in the data.
Recent contributions to which our paper is directly related are Lane and
Milesi-Ferretti (2001, 2003) and Sørensen, Yosha, Wu and Zu (2006).
Lane and Milesi-Ferretti document the virtual explosion in international
asset cross-holdings during the 1990s. We nd that this phenomenon is a
key driving force behind improvements in medium to long term risk sharing
through capital income ows.
Sørensen et al. (2006) show that countries with higher shares of foreign
assets in their net wealth tend to enjoy better income smoothing through
higher international factor income ows. Therefore, the equity home bias
and the lack of international consumption risk sharing appear as twin puz-
zles separated at birth. Our paper maps this idea into a simple theoretical
framework. This integrated framework puts us into the position to make
predictions about the quantitative consistency of the decline in home bias,
the growth in international capital income ows and the rise in risk sharing:
over the period 1990-2004, average OECD asset gross holdings have grown
from 170 to 470 percent of GDP. Over the same time, the fraction of long-
term idiosyncratic output risk that gets shared internationally by the average
OECD country has increased from less than 10 to more than 30 percent. Our
model predicts that virtually all of this increase falls on capital income ows.
We nd overwhelming conrmation for this prediction in the data.
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows: in the next section
we introduce our theoretical framework and use it to motivate the level risk
sharing regression. In section three we present our data and obtain the
country portfolio weights by estimating our level risk sharing regressions. In
section four we relate the estimated portfolio weights to replicate the patterns
of risk sharing, notably of capital income ows, both between countries and
regions. We also show that the longer-term increase risk sharing through
capital income ows that we nd in international data is closely related to
the growth in international gross asset positions. Section ve summarizes
and concludes.
3
2 Income ows, home bias, and consumption
risk sharing: an integrated framework
This section presents a general framework that allows us to study the link
between consumption risk sharing, portfolio home bias and net capital in-
come ows. In the rst instance, we will use this framework to motivate
an alternative way of measuring consumption risk sharing: our approach is
based on panel regressions of relative log-levels of consumption on relative log
levels of output. As we will argue, this approach is more likely to pick up the
e¤ects of nancial globalization over time than are conventional approaches
that have either used consumption correlations or regressions of consumption
growth on output growth.
In a second step, we then ask if the pattern of interregional and inter-
national capital income ows is consistent with the predictions of the model
and with the degree of international risk sharing that we have estimated.
Our framework nests virtually all current theories of consumption: the
only assumption we make is that each period the representative inhabitant
of country or region k consumes a fraction 0 < kt < 1 of her income
Ckt = 
k
t INC
k
t (1)
where C and INC denote per capita values of consumption and income
respectively. For example, this formulation is consistent with permanent
income models, where kt captures the e¤ect of discounting and uncertainty
on consumption, given todays income. We will discuss the interpretation of
kt in more detail below.
Now recall the denition of income from the national accounts: a coun-
trys income equals its output plus net claims to output produced in the rest
of the world.
INCkt = Y
k
t +NFI
k
t
where NFIkt is net factor income from abroad, i.e. the countrys net claims
on ows of foreign output.
Recent work by Sørensen et al. (2006) demonstrates that the degree
to which net factor income ows contribute to smoothing national income
varies positively with the share of foreign assets in country wealth. They
argue that the lack of international consumption risk sharing and the equity
home bias are twin puzzles separated at birth. We formalize this idea in our
framework here by building on Crucini (1999). In order to link international
income ows to the structure of countries asset portfolios in a tractable
manner, we assume that countries trade perpetual claims to their respective
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output streams. Such assets have rst been suggested by Shiller (1993) and
we therefore refer to them as Shiller securities. In our model, each country
allocates its wealth between a claim to domestic assets and a world mutual
fund of foreign Shiller securities. Since income constitutes the dividend from
wealth, per capita income must be the weighted average of dividends paid
on domestic and foreign assets. The dividends of Shiller securities are just
foreign and domestic output, so that per capita income in country k is
INCkt = Y

t + (1  )Y kt (2)
where  is the (ex ante value weighted) share of foreign assets in the countrys
wealth portfolio. Here, Y kt denotes country k per capita output and Y

t is
the average of per capita outputs across all countries. Note that under these
assumptions, net factor income ows are given by
NFIkt = Y
k
t   INCkt = (Y t   Y kt ) (3)
which captures the idea that countries with higher portfolio shares of foreign
assets will achieve more risk sharing through income smoothing, as discussed
by Sørensen et al. (2006).
Perpetual claims to a countrys entire output are not currently traded in
world nancial markets. But while our model is very stylized, we note that
it is also quite general because existing assets in particular equity may at
least in part allow countries and regions to replicate the pay-o¤ structure of a
portfolio of Shiller securities. Clearly, in frictionless markets, countries would
want to diversify completely, which amounts to selling their national output
to the world mutual fund. Hence, under complete diversication, we will have
 = 1. But claims to a countrys entire output would also comprise claims
to labour income and other non-tradeable output components. Furthermore,
we will expect that frictions in nancial and goods markets will drive  away
from unity. The parameter  is therefore a metric of how close observed
income ows are to the income ows we would observe if countries or regions
could completely diversify any idiosyncratic risk by investing all their wealth
in a world portfolio of Shiller securities. We think of  as the e¤ective degree
of diversication of the average country and we refer to it as the Shiller
portfolio weightor as home bias: the parameter  tells us what share of
a countrys income is e¤ectively derived from home and foreign sources and
we turn to estimating  from the data. Plugging (3) into (1), we obtain
Ckt = 
k
t INC
k
t = 
k
t

Y t + (1  )Y kt

(4)
Note that this implies that countries will generally be able to decouple in-
come and consumption through intertemporal substitution of consumption,
5
e.g. through savings and dissavings. We can think of kt as capturing an
array of country-specic e¤ects such as the rates of return on the countrys
or regions wealth. For example, in the context of the permanent income
hypothesis (PIH), consumption should equal the permanent component of
income dened as
INCkPt =
rk
1 + rk
Et
( 1X
l=0

1
1 + rk
l 
INCkt+l
)
where rk is the countrys real interest rate andEt is the expectations operator.
Then, according to the PIH, Ckt = INC
kP
t . Assume for expository purposes
that income follows a stationary AR(1) with autoregressive coe¢ cient ,
0 <  < 1. Then
Ckt =
rk
1 + rk   INC
k
t (5)
so that in this simple case, kt = rk (1 + rk   ) 1 is a country-specic con-
stant reecting the countrys return on wealth and the persistence of its
income process. Clearly, we could also let r vary over time, so that we could
think of variation in kt as reecting time-variation in expected returns on
country wealth.
In the next subsection, we are going to use equation (4) to develop a
simple estimation equation for the portfolio weights  that is based on con-
sumption and output data alone. The road map for the empirical part of
the paper is then as follows: we rst estimate values of . We then use
these values to generate articial income data according to (2) above. The
properties of these articial income data are then compared to actual GNP
and personal state income data. Finally, we show that our measure of port-
folio diversication, , has not only grown in international data but that this
growth is actually closely linked to and quantitatively consistent with the
decline in home bias that one sees in actual international portfolio positions
of OECD countries.
2.1 A risk sharing regression in levels
We rst re-write equation (4) by dividing by world income. For the link
between world consumption and world income, we make an analogous as-
sumption as for the home country, so that Ct = 

t INC

t . Then using world
per capita income as world per capita output, we obtain:
Ckt
Ct
=
kt
t

+ (1  )Y
k
t
Y t

(6)
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Equation (6) will not let us estimate 1  directly from a linear regression.
We therefore base our estimation on a log-linear specication of (6). In
addition, this o¤ers the advantage that it is in keeping with most of the
risk sharing regressions in the literature that are also largely based on log-
linear specications and keeping with this tradition facilitates highlighting
parallels and di¤erences in our approach. Secondly, specications involving
logarithmic levels rather than levels of macroeconomic variables are generally
known to have normal residuals and would therefore a priori appear more
robust.
We now make explicit the assumptions we make in log-linearizing (6). We
apply logarithms on both sides of (6). Denoting kt = log 
k
t   log t , we get
log

Ckt
Ct

= kt + log

+ (1  )Y
k
t
Y t

(7)
Next, we expand the logarithmic term on the right hand side around Y
kP
t
Y Pt
= 1.
This yields
log

+ (1  )Y
kP
t
Y Pt

 log [+ (1  )] + (1  )
+ (1  )

Y kt
Y t
  1

= (1  )

Y kt   Y t
Y t

Finally, approximating
log

Y kt
Y t

 Y
k
t   Y t
Y t
and plugging this expression back into the previous equation, we obtain the
levels risk sharing regression that is the focus of the empirical analysis in this
paper:
log

Ckt
Ct

= kt + (1  ) log

Y kt
Y t

(8)
Having lower-case letters denote logarithms, we can write
ckt   ct = (1  )

ykt   yt

+ kt (9)
This equation is reminiscent of the equations estimated in Mace (1991),
Asdrubali, Sørensen and Yosha (1996), Cochrane (1991) or Crucini (1999).
It relates relative consumption to relative output. Under full risk sharing,
the coe¢ cient on relative (permanent) output should be zero. The decisive
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di¤erence vis-à-vis the earlier literature is that equation (9) relates relative
log-levels whereas earlier implementations were formulated in di¤erences.
In our derivation, we have assumed  to be the same across countries and
in our empirical analysis we estimate (9) as a panel relation. This will allow
us to obtain the degree of home bias (1 ) for the average country. Note
that this setup, while quite similar in spirit to the literature that has esti-
mated such regressions in rst di¤erences, estimating a non-stationary panel
relation such as (9) allows for a high degree of unobserved heterogeneity
across regions and countries through the time-varying, country-specic term
kt .
2 While  can capture a wide array of di¤erent inuences, the require-
ment that a country fulll its intertemporal budget constraint imposes an
important restriction: the process kt essentially reects uctuations in rel-
ative consumption-income ratios and intertemporal budget balance requires
that, in the long run, a countrys consumption will have to correspond to
its income. While, even in the long-run, consumption and income may not
literally be identical, e.g. because the country can systematically reap cap-
ital gains from foreign assets or because precautionary motives induce the
countrys residents to consume less than their actual income, we should still
expect the long-run mean of kt and therefore also of 
k
t to be constant, so
that kt should be stationary. This stationarity of 
k
t implies that (9) consti-
tutes a panel cointegrating relationship. We discuss the econometric issues
involved in the estimation of this relationship below.
We highlight the empirical advantages of our approach vis-à-vis the di¤er-
enced versions of the risk sharing regression (9). Di¤erenced specications of
the risk sharing regression or correlation-basesd measures of risk sharing (see
e.g. the results in Artis and Ho¤mann (2004) and Imbs (2006)) generally do
not appear to pick up an increase in risk sharing over time. Heathcote and
Perri (2004) even report that international consumption correlations have
decreased for the U.S. Conversely, our results here clearly show an increase
in risk sharing (a drop in the estimated coe¢ cient) when we use the levels re-
gression (9) and this increase in risk sharing can be associated with increased
international cross-holdings of assets.
Why does the level regression pick up an increase in risk sharing that the
di¤erenced regression does not seem to register? The term kt is the wedge
between changes in relative consumption and changes in relative income.
According to standard consumption theory, uctuations in the consumption-
income ratio should be a good indicator of future expected discount rates
2In our empirical implementation, we decompose kt = k + u
k
t , where k is a country-
specic xed e¤ect and ukt is a residual. Clearly, besides k additional deterministic but
time varying country-specic terms (such as linear trends) could also be considered.
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or of future income changes. For example, in a permanent income model, if
income changes are serially correlated, changes in kt will be correlated with
changes in income and therefore also with y  y. Hence, the coe¢ cient
in the di¤erenced regression will be a biased estimate of (1   ) and it will
generally be a function of the particular nature of shocks. If the structure
of cyclical shocks changes, the e¤ect of nancial integration on consumption
correlations or the di¤erenced risk sharing regression may get blurred. 3 As
is well-known, in a cointegrating regression such as (9), this simultaneity is
much less of a problem because the joint non-stationary dynamics in relative
output and consumption tends to dominate the stationary term kt in the
estimation. Thus, we should expect the level risk sharing regression to pick
up longer-term trends in risk sharing more robustly, whereas the outcome
of the di¤erenced regressions may also depend on what type of shocks tend
to hit the economy. If the structure of shocks hitting a group of economies
or the propagation mechanism to output is changing over time4, then the
increase in risk sharing may not be picked up by di¤erenced regressions.5
3 Empirical Implementation
3.1 Data
We apply our approach to two data sets: one for U.S. states and one for a
group of 23 OECD countries. All data are annual.
The US-data set is the one also used by Asdrubali, Sørensen and Yosha6
and is based on gross-state product and income data from the Bureau of
3The quantitative-theoretical considerations in Heathcote and Perri (2004) strongly
suggest that the nature of international shocks has changed since the beginning of the
1980s. In an earlier paper, (Artis and Ho¤mann (2004)) we have explored the impact of
this change on consumption correlations and the di¤erenced regressions commonly used
in the risk sharing literature.
4In fact, nancial integration itself could be responsible for such changes. Imbs (2006)
nds that the main reason why the quantity puzzle persists even between pairs of nan-
cially relatively integrated economies is that nancial integration also increases business
cycle correlations.
5We note that this is not tantamount to saying that an increase in risk sharing cannot
possibly be teased out from the data using a di¤erenced regression approach. For example,
Sørensen et al. (2006) detect an increase in risk sharing once they relate a ltered sequence
of cross-sectional estimates of the di¤erenced regression to the growth in international
portfolio holdings. However, our use of the levels regression tackles the problem in an
arguably more direct way and allows a straightforward theoretical interpretation of the
estimated coe¢ cient.
6The data base is available at Oved Yoshas web page
http://econ.tau.ac.il/research/riskshare/channels/channels.htm
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Economic Analysis (BEA). Since consumption data at the state level are not
available, it is common practice7 to use retail sales data by state. These retail
sales data are re-scaled by the share of retail sales in aggregate (US-wide)
consumption to obtain measures of state level consumption data. All data
are deated by the US-wide consumption price index. The US-data range
from 1960 to 1990.
Country-level data are from the Penn World Table, release 6.2 (PWT
6.12.) by Heston, Summers and Aten (2006) and range from 1960 to 2004.
All data are in constant (2000) international prices. The countries included
in our estimation are:
1. Canada, 2. the United States, 3. Japan, 4. Austria, 5. Belgium,
6. Denmark , 7. Finland, 8. France, 9. Germany (West), 10. Greece, 11.
Iceland, 12. Ireland, 13. Italy, 14. Luxemburg, 15. Netherlands, 16. Norway,
17. Portugal, 18. Spain, 19. Sweden, 20. Switzerland, 21. United Kingdom,
22. Australia, 23. New Zealand.
Most of these countries are OECD countries and we will refer to them
under this label. As regards the US, we follow the general practice in the US
regional business cycle literature and include all states except Washington
D.C.
We express all data in per capita terms. Rest of the World (RoW) aggre-
gates are the US- or OECD-wide average per capita values. Population data
are from the BEA and PWT respectively.
Over the sample period covered by our international data set, interna-
tional nancial markets have become increasingly liberalized. To take ac-
count of this change, we will report results obtained for two subperiods: the
rst covers the period 1960-1990, the second covers 1990-2004. The results
we obtain from the rst sub-period can be compared directly to others in
the literature (the studies by Sørensen and Yosha (1998) and Crucini (1999)
cover the same period), while the results from the second sub-period should
provide insights into the e¤ects of the dramatic increase in gross interna-
tional asset positions that took place in particular in the 1990s (compare e.g.
the data in Lane (2000), Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2001, 2006) and Kraay,
Loayza, Serven and Ventura (2000)).
3.2 Estimating portfolio shares
We now turn to estimating the Shiller portfolio weights based on the level
risk sharing regression (9). In the light of our previous discussion, we treat
7Asdrubali, Sørensen and Yosha (1996), Hess and Shin (1998) and DelNegro(2002) all
follow this approach.
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equation (9) as a cointegrating relationship.8
This relationship can, in principle, be estimated consistently by OLS.
However, OLS may su¤er from second-order bias due to potential simultane-
ity and serial correlation of the errors. Phillips and Moon (1999) therefore
advocate a panel version of the fully modied least squares (FMLS) method.
Since the FMLS estimator is semiparametric, it may, however, be imper-
fectly suited to relatively small samples. The panel dynamic OLS (PDOLS)
estimator suggested by Mark and Sul (2003) may be preferable in this case.
Also, Mark and Sul (2003) have forcefully argued for the dynamic panel OLS
estimator on grounds of its computational simplicity. We conduct all our
analyses here based on the panel OLS and the panel dynamic OLS estima-
tor.
The panel dynamic OLS estimator accounts for serial correlation and
potential simultaneity by including leads and lags of the di¤erences of the
right hand side variables. We experimented with various leads and lags and
found our results to be very robust across specications. All results were
also very similar to those obtained from plain panel OLS estimates. The
PDOLS parameter estimates in table 1 are based on one lead and lag for
each country which we found su¢ cient to capture serial dependence in our
annual data. To ensure that we can really treat (9) as a panel cointegrating
relation, we perform Pedronis (2004) group mean test for panel cointegration
on the residuals of the country-wise PDOLS-regressions. These tests strongly
suggests to reject the null of no cointegration in all samples and subperiods.
They are reported as memorandum items at the bottom of table 1.
In our estimation, we assume that the relative consumption-income ratio
kt can be decomposed into a common-time-specic component  t, a country-
or region-specic xed e¤ect k and into a country-specic mean zero residual
process ukt so that
kt =  t + k + u
k
t
The modelling of the term kt and in particular the treatment of the
region- or country-specic xed e¤ect k a¤ects the interpretation of the
estimated coe¢ cients as measures of risk sharing and international diversi-
cation: the pooled estimate, which does not control for the xed e¤ect k,
emphasizes the between-dimension of the data, similar to a between estima-
tor which would eliminate all the within-country or region variation in kt .
8Whether or not (9) constitutes a cointegrating relationship is without consequence
for the point estimates of (1   ). As Phillips and Moon (1999) note, the coe¢ cient of
a non-stationary panel regression is meaningful even if there is no cointegration between
the variables. The cointegration tests we report below do, however, support the view that
(9) is a cointegrating relation.
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This tells us about the amount of risk sharing we would see if the country-
specic (relative) consumption-income ratios kt are close to their respective
long-run means, so that after income diversication there is no further
consumption smoothing out of current income. In the model above, in which
we focus on the role of capital income ows for risk sharing, this is exactly
what we aim to capture. We therefore associate the coe¢ cient from the
pooled regression with portfolio home bias and use it as our long-run risk
sharing measure 1  .
Conversely, the xed e¤ect estimate, that we denote with U , accentuates
the impact of of departures of relative consumption-income ratios from their
long-run mean.9 As we argue below, the cross-sectional covariance of ukt
with relative output growth, ykt   yt , is a measure of the contribution
of intertemporal consumption smoothing to risk sharing. We do not expect
uctuations in the consumption-income ratio to contribute to risk sharing in
the very long-run, though. We therefore interpret U as a measure of risk
sharing at medium horizons, given the long-run portfolio home bias captured
by 1  .
We present the results from level risk sharing regression with and without
country- or region xed e¤ects in table 1.10 Our ndings carry a clear mes-
sage: For US federal states, we nd a home bias of around 50 percent, almost
irrespective of whether we control for xed e¤ects or not. In international
data, not controlling for xed e¤ects, we detect a home bias of over 90 percent
in the 1960-90 period. For the later (i.e. the globalization) period, estimates
of (1   ) are around 0:75. This is considerably lower than in the 1960-90
period and the di¤erence does appear to be signicant. Once we control for
country-heterogeneity by removing xed e¤ects, the increase in international
risk sharing in the post-1990 period comes out even more strongly: for the
1960-90 period we now nd virtually no risk sharing (U = 0:98), whereas
for the globalization period the corresponding value is around U = 0:65.
Note that the choice of estimation method (OLS vs. PDOLS) has virtually
no e¤ect on the results.11
9The xed e¤ect panel OLS estimator can be written as the time average of the cross-
sectional regressions of the previously demeaned variables (see e.g. Asdrubali, Sørensen
and Yosha (1996)).
10In both cases, like in all panel regressions reported in the remainder of the paper, we
control for time-xed e¤ects.
11This result is informative about the empirical relevance of theoretical scenarios in
which consumption and output are incidentally correlated for reasons that are unrelated
to nancial markt incompleteness, for example, due to preferences that are non-separable
in consumption and leisure as in Backus, Kehoe and Kydland (1992). The fact that we do
not nd major di¤erences between the PDOLS - which implicitly controls for this incidental
correlation and the panel OLS estimates supports the notion that such non-separabilities
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The estimates in table 1 suggest that there is a lack of risk sharing in
international data in both subperiods, but even at the regional level we nd
that U.S. citizens own a disproportionate share of the claims to output of the
federal state in which they live arond 50 percent of regional wealth is held
in assets in the own region. This result provides a perspective on the relative
size of intra- and international home bias: by measuring the e¤ective degree of
nancial integration, we also take account of those components of a nations
or regions output risk that are not traded in nancial markets: the equity of
small rms or companies is most likely not traded across countries or regions
nor are claims to the labour share of national or regional outputs. Our esti-
mates seem to reect this. Against this background, our estimate in table 1
of the increase in international portfolio diversication during the 1990s a
drop of 1  from 0:91 to 0:74 when no country-xed e¤ects are controlled for
amounts to a dramatic increase in international risk sharing: if our empiri-
cal measure of home bias among U.S. states ( 0:5) is taken as a benchmark,
then around 40 percent ((0:91  0:75) = (0:91  0:47) = 0:17=0:43  0:4) of
the international home bias (relative to regional home bias) has vanished
in the years after 1990. This suggests that the increase in risk sharing in
international data is not only statistically signicant but also economically
important. For the sample period we have examined here, i.e. from the late
1980s or early 1990s to 2004, researchers who have examined international
portfolio holdings directly (Lane (2000), Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2001),
Kraay et al. (2000)) report a considerable growth in the gross foreign asset
positions of OECD countries. In the next section, we provide empirical ev-
idence that better international portfolio diversication and the increase in
international consumption risk sharing are closely related.
4 Patterns of risk sharing and international
asset positions
Our theoretical framework allows an integrated treatment of consumption
risk sharing and portfolio home bias. It also permits us to explore to what
extent international asset positions help to share risk through international
income ows. In this section, we now tie our abstract measure of home bias,
1   , to evidence on actual portfolio holdings and on international capi-
tal income ows. First, in subsection 4.1 we show that our estimates of 
are not likely to have an important e¤ect on risk sharing regressions. This is in line
with Backus, Kehoe and Kydlands own conclusion that the non-separability between
consumption and leisure cannot quantitatively resolve the consumption correlation puzzle.
13
are able to reproduce the patterns of capital income ows and intertemporal
consumption smoothing as we observe them in both U.S. as well as in inter-
national data: capital income ows are the predominant channel of long-run
risk sharing in U.S. data, and at the longer horizon on which we focus in
this paper, they also explain the rise of risk sharing in international data.
Secondly, section 4.2 demonstrates that the increase in  and the associ-
ated growth in international capital income ows are closely linked to the
internationalisation of industrialised countriesasset portfolios as it has been
documented in the recent literature.
4.1 Channels of risk sharing
Our theoretical framework nests two channels of risk sharing. The rst is the
one our discussions have been focussing on so far: capital income ows, that
we associated with the wedge between a countrys or regions output, may
help a country to smooth its income. Building an Asdrubali, Sorensen and
Yosha (1996), we measure the importance of this channel through regressions
of the form
ykt   yt
  inckt   inct  = Kk + Kk + K ykt   yt + vKt (10)
where `inc` denotes the logarithm of income and Kt is a country or region
xed e¤ect. We think of international or interregional capital income ows
as being derived from ex ante diversication of countriesor regionsport-
folios.In our model this ex ante diversication amounts to the choice of the
international portfolio weight  and if our model is in line with the data, we
should therefore have K = . We call the channel the capital income ow,
income smoothing or ex ante channel.
Secondly, countries or regions can further smooth consumption relative
to income through intertemporal asset trade. Variation in the consumption-
income ratio12 captures to what extent a country or region manages to decou-
ple its consumption. In our model, this is represented through time-variation
in kt . We refer to this second channel as the ex post or intertemporal channel
or as consumption smoothing. We measure its contribution to risk sharing
through regressions of the form
inckt   inct
  ckt   ct  = Ct + Ck + C ykt   yt + vCt (11)
Both the ex ante and ex post channels together account for the entirety of
consumption risk sharing, so that
12Note that the (relative) consumption-income ratio corresponds to kt in (1) above
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K + C = 1  U
and U is the unsmoothed share of idiosyncratic risk, which can be obtained
from the regression
ckt   ct

= Ut + 
U
k + U

ykt   yt

+ vUt
which is exactly the xed e¤ect level risk sharing regression that we have
estimated in the previous section.
We call a particular combination of K and C a pattern of risk sharing.
It is apparent that, while the total extent of risk sharing 1   U does not
depend on income, the dynamics of income ows is key for the pattern of risk
sharing: if there is no ex ante diversication of a countrys or regions asset
portfolio, we would expect income and output to be the same and K = 0.
Hence, any risk sharing would only occur ex post as consumption smoothing.
Conversely, the same amount of overall risk sharing 1 U could be achieved
ex ante through income ows alone, with consumption equalling income.
Thus, given U , the dynamics of income determines the pattern of risk
sharing. Since, our model predicts that income is
INCkt = Y

t + (1  )Y kt (12)
the values of K and C depend directly on .
Using our estimate of , we generate articial income data according
to (12), based on actual values of GDP for Y  and Y k. We then compare
predicted income to actual GNP and state-leve income. Specically, we
estimate the panel equations (10) and (11) using real-world data for y and c,
but once based on actual income data and a second time using our articial
income data. In this way we check to what extent our model can replicate
the pattern of risk sharing that we see in the data. We emphasize that this
exercise imposes a strong but quite natural test on our model because 
has been estimated from consumption and output data alone, without ever
making use of income data.
For the U.S., the real world income data we use for this exercise is state-
level personal income. In international data, we measure income through
gross national product (GNP). The Penn World Tables contain GNP only
after 1970. We therefore limit our analysis of international data from now on
to the post-1970 period. This does not a¤ect the interpretation of our results
since our estimates of 1   for the 1970-90 period are virtually identical to
those obtained for the 1960-90 period.
For the generation of the articial income data, we use a value for 1  of
0:48 for the United States. For the OECD countries, we set 1  to 0:91 in the
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1970-90 period and to 0:74 in the period 1990-2004. These values correspond
to our estimates of (1  ) in table 1, based on the PDOLS procedure in the
model without xed e¤ects. At the bottom of table 2, we report the average
across countries and regions of the correlations between articial and actual
idiosyncratic income growth rates. For the average U.S. state the correlation
between actual and tted income growth is 0:77. At the international level,
the model performs even better: here, it generates an average correlation of
0:94 in the 1970-90 period and of 0:85 in 1990-2004.
We estimate equations (10) and (11) using panel dynamic OLS with one
lead and lag, controlling for xed e¤ects and for common time-specic varia-
tion. The upper panel in table 2 reports the results based on both predicted
and actual income data.
For the U.S., the predicted pattern of risk sharing is almost identical to
that found in the data. In addition very much as our model would predict
 the values of K and  are virtually the same. The estimates clearly
suggest that most risk sharing in the U.S. takes place through capital income
ows. While there is some consumption smoothing ex post, this appears
overall insignicant. This conrms our previous expectation that to the
least in the longer term as it is emphasized by our theoretical and empirical
framework better risk sharing will have to be associated with larger capital
income ows. To the extent that (relative) consumption-income ratios appear
stationary in the data and to the extent that they are stationary in theory 
as, for example, in a permanent-income model insurance against permanent
shocks is possible only through ex ante diversication, not through ex post
smoothing.
The same feature may explain why we nd virtually no (long-run) risk
sharing in international data in the pre-1990 period: the ex post channel is
virtually inactive in the longer term, but so is the ex ante channel.
Though our model would somewhat overpredict the amount of ex ante
risk sharing in the 70-90 period (the predicted K is 0:08 vs. 0:01 in the
data), it remains true that the overall pattern of risk sharing is very much
in line with what our model would predict: these are the results for the
period before the huge internationalisation of asset ownership and we would
expect that the huge portfolio home bias that prevailed at that time would
be reected in low capital income ows.
The picture changes completely once we turn to the globalization period:
now there is a considerable amount of risk sharing in international data,
roundabout one quarter to 30 percent of idiosyncratic output risk gets shared
ex ante. There is also a moderate increase in ex post consumption smoothing.
But this e¤ect is much more subdued and the ex post channel appears only
marginally signicant. Again, the regressions based on predicted income get
16
very close to the real-world pattern of risk sharing.
The results here would seem to stand in contrast to an important litera-
ture that has shown that international risk sharing is lower than in U.S. data
mainly because international capital income ows do not contribute to risk
sharing (Sørensen and Yosha (1998), Becker and Ho¤mann (2006)). Lane
(2001) concludes that international investment income ows have practically
no bearing on risk sharing internationally. These analyses have typically
focused on business cycle frequencies of the data by looking at versions of
the regressions (10) and (11) that are formulated in rst di¤erences. In the
middle panel of table 3 we estimate such di¤erenced regressions, again for
actual and predicted income ows.
The regressions based on actual income clearly corroborate the ndings
in the studies referenced above: The lack of international consumption risk
sharing frequently is mainly a lack of ex ante income smoothing: for the 1960-
90 period we nd roundabout 40 percent income smoothing for the U.S. and
virtually none in international data. We nd a small rise in international
consumption risk sharing in the 1990-2004 period, with K + C increasing
from 0:27 to 0:33. But this di¤erence seems tiny and appears insignicant.
Furthermore, even in the globalization period, only a small share of an in-
crease would be explained by capital income ows; K increases from 0:03
to 0:06 and, again, the increase is insignicant.
We are primarily concerned with the long-term relation between income
ows, home bias and consumption risk sharing. Still, it is interesting to see
that our model is able to match the business cycle frequency patterns of
risk sharing among U.S. federal states . It does, however, predict too much
income smoothing and too little consumption smoothing ex post in interna-
tional data. Given the focus of the paper, we do not explore this nding in
any depth. Valuation e¤ects on foreign asset positions as they have been em-
phasized by a recent literature could however provide an explanation: in the
short to medium-term, valuation e¤ects may allow a country to smooth con-
sumption through the realization of capital gains rather than through capital
income. Since the realization of capital gains amounts to a sale of foreign
assets and therefore works through the ex post channel our model would
 for a given average stock of foreign assets  tend to overpredict income
smoothing and underpredict consumption smoothing, exactly as we observe
it here. According to the results in Gourinchas and Rey (2006), valuation
e¤ects are mainly driven by exchange rate changes, which could also explain
why we match the pattern of risk sharing at the business cycle frequency in
U.S. data but not in international data. We explore the role of valuation
e¤ects for international risk sharing at the business cycle frequency in sep-
arate, still ongoing work. At the longer horizon, however, quite in keeping
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with the results reported e.g. by Gourinchas and Rey (2006), one would ex-
pect these valuation e¤ects to play a rather minor role. Our results not only
lend further support to this view. They also provide further justication for
our approach here: to look for the link between consumption risk-sharing,
capital income ows and home bias in the lower frequencies of the data.
We sum up our ndings in this subsection as follows: In spite of its sim-
plicity, we nd that our model does a very good job in replicating the longer
term patterns of risk sharing both among U.S. federal states and in interna-
tional data. At medium to longer horizons, the increase in international risk
sharing is associated with an increase in international capital income ows.
We now show that both phenomena have a common explanation: the decline
in international portfolio home bias.
4.2 The increase in international risk sharing and the
growth in gross international asset positions
In this subsection, we show that the decline in our home bias measure 1  is
closely linked to the internationalisation of asset ownership. As our measure
of international portfolio diversication we use gross asset positions, the sum
of assets and liabilities, relative to GDP. This choice is based on some a priori
theoretical and empirical considerations. First, Obstfeld (2004) distinguishes
between two motives for asset trade: intertemporal or development asset
trade, which is reected in net investment positions and diversication asset
trade, which he associates with gross asset positions. Our interest in this
paper is clearly in the risk sharing or diverscation aspect of asset trade.
Secondly, measuring home bias through gross asset positions is consistent
with our model in which the average country swaps a share  of claims to
its own output for a share  of claims to world average output. Hence, 
is a measure of the cross-sectional average of countrys gross asset positions.
Finally, the focus on gross asset positions can also be justied at an empirical
level: Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2003) note that there has been a virtual
explosion in the gross-holdings of assets whereas net positions have remained
quite stable. In identifying a cause for the huge increase in risk sharing,
one may therefore wish to turn to the most salient change in the structure
of international asset positions, which has been in gross rather than in net
positions.
To obtain a detailed time prole of the decrease in home bias we now let
 vary from period to period. We do so in two ways: rst, by running a
sequence of cross-sectional versions of our level risk sharing regression:
ckt   ct = (1  t)

ykt   yt

+  t + ukt (13)
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Secondly, in order to capture the impact of increased gross-asset holdings
over time, we modify our panel level risk sharing regression to take account
of the internationalisation of average gross asset positions. Specically, we
parametrize  as  
1  GFAt

= 0 + 1GFAt (14)
where GFAt is the average (across countries) gross foreign asset position
relative to GDP:
GFAt =
1
K
KX
k=1
GFAkt and GFA
k
t =
Akt + L
k
t
Y kt
Here, K denotes the number of countries, Akt is assets and L
k
t liabilities and
the bar denotes the cross-sectional mean. Our data source is the March
2006 release of the external wealth of nations data set by Philip Lane and
Gianmaria Milesi-Ferretti (2006). To obtain estimates of 0 and 1, we plug
(14) into our panel level risk sharing regression and estimate the ensuing
regression with interaction terms by panel dynamic OLS. Based on these
estimates, we can then obtain a second time series of 1   t from (14). We
refer to this alternative estimate of  as GFA.
We obtain these two time-varying measures of  for the period from 1975
to 2004. Using panel dynamic OLS, we estimate 
1  GFAt

= 1:01  0:1GFAt
with PDOSL-corrected t-statistics on 0 and 1 of 19:97 and 2:94 respectively.
There is a statistically signicant link betweeen average gross foreign asset
positions and risk sharing. Our estimate of 0 is virtually unity, suggesting
that cross-holdings of assets seem to account for all the consumption risk
sharing we see in the data. Finally, it is interesting to appreciate the magni-
tude of the coe¢ cient 1: increasing average gross foreign asset holdings by
100 percent of GDP will increase consumption risk sharing by roundabout
10 percentage points.
In Figure (1) we plot both the estimated coe¢ cients (1   t) from the
sequence of cross-sectional regressions in (13) as well as the measure based
on the parametrization (14), 1   GFAt . Though obtained from di¤erent
approaches, the two measures both clearly indicate an increase in risk sharing
that is of a very similar magnitude. We obtain standard errors for 1 t from
a jackknife procedure (Efron (1982)), in which we re-estimate the sequence
1 t 23 times, dropping one country from the sample at a time. Over most of
the sample period, the GFA-based measure is statistically indistinguishable
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from 1   t.13 We nd this particularly remarkable since we have not been
using any information about asset holdings in estimating the sequence of
cross-sectional regressions (13).14 These ndings suggest that the decline
in our home bias measure and the associated rise in risk sharing are indeed
intimately linked to the growth in international asset portfolio diversication.
5 Summary and Conclusion
A key nding of our paper is that consumption risk sharing among OECD
countries has improved dramatically over the last decade. This nding is
what one should expect in a world where the barriers to international capital
ows have virtually been removed and it ties in with the bulk of empirical
evidence that suggests that international cross-holdings of claims to capital
have grown considerably. Still, the literature so far has found it relatively
di¢ cult to document that higher capital mobility actually does nd its re-
ection in better international consumption risk sharing. Our framework,
based on non-stationary panel regressions, has allowed us to document that
countriesconsumption risks are indeed a lot more diversied now than they
were in the past. Improvements in risk sharing, however, seem to be a longer-
term phenomenon. This is why they are more easily revealed by our level
risk sharing regressions and not by econometric specications that emphasize
the business cycle link between consumption and output risk by using data
that has been di¤erenced to induce stationarity.
Not only do our estimates suggest that international consumption risk
sharing has increased considerably during the recent globalization period.
They also reveal a marked increase in the role of international income ows
for risk sharing among countries and this increase seems to be tightly linked
to the internationalisation of industrialised countriesinvestment positions.
13Only towards the end of the sample period, the two measures diverge somewhat, as
the decline in 1   t seems to atten for a couple of years. A potential explanation is
that the global stock market decline after 2000 has lowered the value of equity and other
nancial assets relative to real assets, notably human wealth and housing. Since holdings
of these assets are not internationally diversied, international risk sharing may well have
decreased temporarily only to pick up again in 2003 with the recovery of international
stock markets. Since 1  GFAt is a function of gross foreign asset positions only which
have continued to grow relative to GDP it does not detect this temporary decrease in
risk sharing.
14In fact, this is a major advantage of our levels-based regression approach. Sequences of
cross-sectional regressions of di¤erenced risk sharing regressions are much more volatile and
only show a statistically signicant link to measures of nancial portfolio diversication
once they have been ltered. See e.g. Sørensen et al. (2006) and Kose et al. (2006).
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Again, the increase in capital income ows is much more pronounced once
we focus on the longer-term interactions between the data and at these hori-
zons our empirical model that is estimated from output and consumption
data alone can replicate this rise in international investment income ows
with remarkable precision.
A number of inuential recent studies, notably Lane and Milesi-Ferretti
(2003, 2005) and Rey and Gourinchas (2006) have emphasized the role of
valuation e¤ects for the dynamics of international asset positions. At business
cycle horizons, such valuation e¤ects could by themselves be an important
channel of risk sharing that allows to substitute for capital income ows. In
ongoing work, we explore the possibility that this could help explain why
the rise of income ows derived from international investment positions is
much more obvious in the longer-term while such capital income ows remain
relatively limited at shorter horizons.
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Table 1: Estimates of the home bias (1  )
Panel I: Pooled Regressions (w/o xed e¤ects)
(ckt   ct ) = const+  t + (1  )(ykt   yt ) + ukt
United States OECD
(1960-90) 1960-90 1990-2004
OLS 0.48 (0.01) 0.93 (0.01) 0.75 (0.03)
Panel Dynamic OLS 0.47 (0.02) 0.91 (0.02) 0.74 (0.06)
Panel II: Fixed e¤ect regressions
(ckt   ct ) = const+  t + k + U(ykt   yt ) + ukt
United States OECD
(1960-90) 1960-90 1990-2004
OLS 0.50 (0.02) 0.98 (0.02) 0.63 (0.02)
Panel Dynamic OLS 0.52 (0.04) 0.99 (0.04) 0.66 (0.03)
Cointegration tests
-2.36 -2.42 -2.17
NOTES: The results reported for the panel dynamic OLS estimation are based on estimating equations
of the form ckt   ckt = bbxkt +Ppl= p klxt l + vkt where xkt = (ykt   ykt) and
vkt =  t + u
k
t or v
k
t =  t + k + u
k
t , depending on whether it is a pooled or xed regression.
Standard errors are given in parentheses. Those for the PDOLS estimates are based on Mark and Sul
(2003).All regressions control for time xed e¤ects. The panel cointegration tests at the bottom of the
table are Pedronis (20004) group mean t-statistics and are based on the PDOLS xed-e¤ect regressions.
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Table 2: Risk sharing patterns based on predicted and actual income data
United States OECD
1970-90 1990-2004
1   = 0:48 1   = 0:90 1   = 0:74
Data ex ante ex post ex ante ex post ex ante ex post
Levels Regressions
predicted 0.45 0.03 0.08 -0.01 0.29 0.06
(0.01) (0.04) (0.01) (0.06) (0.01) (0.03)
actual 0.45 0.03 0.01 0.06 0.26 0.09
(0.03) (0.03) (0.05) (0.06) (0.04) (0.04)
Di¤erenced Regressions
predicted 0.47 0.37 0.08 0.18 0.28 0.05
(0.01) (0.03) (0.001) (0.04) (0.01) (0.04)
actual 0.39 0.46 0.03 0.24 0.06 0.27
(0.01) (0.03) (0.02) (0.04) (0.03) (0.05)
Correlations
0.77 0.94 0.85
NOTES: regression coe¢ cients from equations (10) (ex ante) and (11) (ex post), based on actual
and predicted income data. The predicted income data are generated according to equation (2) with the
portfolio shares  given at the top of the column. All regressions control for time-specic and region- or
country specic xed e¤ects. Under the heading correlationswe report the average across countries or
regions of the correlation between predicted and actual idiosyncratic income growth.
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Figure 1: The increase in consumption risk sharing 1975-2004.
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Notes: The blue (solid /dots) line is the sequence of cross-sectional estimates
of (1 t). The red (dashed/ squares) line is 1 GFAt = 1:01 0:1GFAt where
GFAt is the cross-country mean gross foreign asset position. The thin (black)
solid lines are the plus/minus two standard deviation bands for 1   t. These
standard deviations are obtained using a jackknife resampling procedure.
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